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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In May 1967, President Jo~eph D. Mobutu established the Popular 
Movement of the Revolution (MPR) as one of tqe political parties that 
would participate in the national election~ in the Republic of Zaire. 1 
From independence in June 1960, to the. coup d'etat that propelled Mobutu 
to the presidency iri November 1965, Zaire had a multi-party politica,l 
structure. Under the·constitution that was written in 1967, a two-party 
system was technically possible; however, it soon became.apparent that 
Zaire would follow the pattern of many othei;- African Stat~s by establish-
ing a single-...party political system. The. official justification for 
this action was that the multi-party system had "caused divisions., 
anarchy, and confusion and that thousands of Congolese had been.killed 
and entire regions devastated in the name of nationalism and democraGy. 112 
In other words, the multi-party political system reflected the cultural 
and ethnic fragmentation of Zaire. This fragmentation resulted in.a 
lack of consensus.on the type of political system that should be estab-
lished, on the political role of the individual in the system, and 
generally, an absence of political trust. More simply stated, there 
1The · Constitut.ion of 1967 allowed for "no more than two political 
parties" to be established. "Draft Constitution of the Democratic. 
Republic of the Congo," Translations on Africa, No. 566, 1967, Art. 4. 
211 Single.Party for the Congo," The New York Times, May 24, 1970, 
col. 5, p. 70. 
1 
was a fragmented political culture that the multi-party system rein-
forced; thus barring compromise on basic political issues. 
This thesis is. concerned with three basic questions,. First, who 
are the current political leaders and what are their political back-
grounds? Second, how are these leaders attempting to establish a domi-
nant political culture? Third, what are the characteristics of the 
political culture that these leaders are attempting to create? 
2 
Dev.elopment of a ·dominant political culture is one of the necessary 
steps taken by a society to bring about the orderly functioning of a 
political system, for without this development, the political system can 
not achieve a wide measure of legitimacy or consensus. For the purpose 
of this thesis, the creation ,of a dominant political culture within a 
society refers only to those·individuals or groups that are.allowed to 
participate in the political system. In culturally fragmented and 
ethnically .divided states such as Zaire, a dominant political culture is 
necessary to prevent the occurence of the political.instabil:i,ty such as 
that; which took place in Zaire from 1960 through 1967. Therefore, the 
problem to. which this the$is addresses itself is, can .. the present 
single-,.party political system of Zaire create a dominant polit:i,cal 
culture? 
President Mobutu is attempting to create a dominant political 
culture through the MPR. The, process.by which the .party is attempting 
to create this dominant culture is the polit;:ical socialization process, 
i.e., the process by which individuals are inducted into the political 
system, and the way their attitudes toward political objects are changed. 
The purpose of .this thesis is not to claim that the so-called tribal and 
regional hatred or disrespect and mistrust.have no place in Zairean 
3 
politics, but to show tqat there was an absence of a.dominant political 
culture at the time of independence, and that the multi-party system 
reinforced the fragmentation that existed at that time. The current 
attempts to CJieate a dominant·poJ,.itic,al culture through the s~ructure of 
the MPR have met with a measure of success. 
Literature Review 
There .. are pressures which act against the orderly expansion of·· the 
Zairean political system. · Zaire has been struggling with the require-
ment of building the spiritual base of nationhood and the functional. 
structures of the state while performing the expected qaily operations · 
of a political system. 
The·basic problem, as Claude Ake states, is, "the problem of devel-
oping a political,cul~ure and inducing a commitment. to it;. 113 For the 
system as a whole; politic~! cul.ture provides a systematic structure of 
values anq national consideratio11s whi.ch ensures coherence in the per-
forma11ce.of institutio11s·and organizatioqs, and giyes the system a 
f b ·1· 4 measure.o sta 1 ity. The nature of the values, which make up the po:\.i-
tical culture must.be such that the commitment to them furthers the. 
mai11tenance of the ,political. structure. To use Sidney Verba' s example: 
P• 1. 
the belief that political power ought to be used to promote· 
the inte.rest of a parochially defined group may be .connnon 
held. But the fact that; members .of the politic~! system may 
differ on the pf:tr.ticular parochial group whose interest is 
to be promoted may lea4 . to grave political. s'trife. 5 
3 Claude Ake, A Theory. of Politicl:J,l Integration (Homewopd, 1967), 
4rbid., pp. 1-4. 
5Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic,Culture (Boston, 
1963)' p. 11. 
James Bustin, in his essay, "The Quest for Political Stability in 
the Congo," agrees with Verba. Bustin states that, "reliance on the 
normative and coercive apparatus of the state tends to be maximized in 
those countries where values of national consciousness and popular 
mobilization are most deficient. 116 In other words, where a poli,tical 
culture is not unquestionably rooted in a sufficiently widespread 
national sentiment, it tends to be derived from such sources as control 
of institutions, the effective use of state power, and adherence to a 
certain amount of legal formality. 
Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell Jr. state that: 
The question of orientatioI).s ·to.the national political.system 
as.a whole constitutes one.of the most serious developmental 
problems in the political systems of the new nations.. In 
Africa these nations have been constructed from a great va-
riety of ethnic, political, and geographic subnational units 
which have no commonpolitical bonds and whose members by and 
large have little information and loyalty beyond this local 
unit. The process.of nation building involyes in some·re-
spect the dissemination of information about.and the conunit7 
ment. to the nationa.l unit. At some point in the history of 
any new nation, as loyalty to the traditional subnational 
units conflicts with national loyalties and goals, the issues 
of D;ational identity are likely to become paramount.7 
Neville Curtis, in his essay, "South Africa: .. The Politics of 
4 
Fragmentation," writes about a political party and its efforts to create 
a fragmented political culture. The Nat;iona,list Party, with its control 
over the.political socialization process, is attempting to.fragment the 
peoples of.South Africa into social and ethnic groups, and effectively 
segregate one from the others. Thus, by its control of the political 
6James Bustin, "The Quest for Political Stability in.the Congo," 
Africa, Herbert J. Spiro, ed. (New York, 1966), p. 21. 
7Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingpam Powell Jr., Comparative Politic!'!: 
A Developmental Approach .. (Bostpn, 1966), p. 52. 
socialization process, the Nationalist Party of South Africa has at-
tempted to create as many as 20 different political cultures. 8 
Peter M. Gukiina bases his entire book on the problems of creating 
9 
a dominant political culture in Uganda. Gukiina says that the most 
significant element of Uganda's politica,l unrest is.the diversity of 
5 
Ugandan ethnic.groups. The first part of his study examines the absence 
of a dominant political culture in Uganda at the time of independence, 
with a review of the precolonial and colonial experiences. The second 
section of the book examines Dr. Milto.n Obote's (the former President of 
Uganda) attempts to create a dominant political culture through the 
creation .of a one .... party-,.dominant poli,tical system. This party stressed 
the need for national consensus and political unity and structured the 
government so as to give all eth,nic groups representation. Thus, through 
time,·nationa,l loyalties would emerge out of the central government's 
responsiveness to those interests and expectations widely held in all 
parts of Uganda. 
Hypothesis and Definitions 
In an a~tempt to offer a solution to the questions which have been 
raised, the following hypothesis has been.formulated. The experience of 
Zaire would suggest that in ethnically fragmented societies an inte-
grated politi,cal leadership working through a single-party system will 
more likely generate a dominant political culture than a pluralistic · 
leadership dispersed within a multi-party system. 
8Neville Curtis, "South Africa: The Politics of Fragmentation," 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. ·so, No. ·2 (January, 1972), pp. 283-296. 
9 Peter M. Gukiina, Uganda: A Case Study in African Political· 
Development (Notre Dame, 1972), pp. 1-12. 
Defining these concepts is not a sim~le task. There is yet no . 
substantial agreement among scholars as tq their meaning. De(initions 
to date vary, depeI).ding on the perspect:ive of the. author and the .neeqs 
of specific studies. The writers qi,scussed briefly in thi~ study are, 
at best, only representative of the.principal scholars. who have worked 
on these concepts. 
Political culture for the purposes of this thesis mean,s "a system 
of empirical beliefs, expressive symb0ls and values which define the 
situation in which political action takes place. 1110 nut :what are some 
6 
of these beliefs and values? First:, there is an awareness of and support 
for the national political ·system as a whole. This problem of national 
identity is intens.ified in stat;es without a tradH:ion of national in-: 
volyement • The various ethn.ic groups will correctly perceive that their 
institutions and values-are being threaten~d and wLl-1 no doubt resist, 
thereby creating conflicts of; loyalty. Second, there needs to be a 
basic,conception of how politi,cs is conducted. In other words, is it a 
harmonious process or,a discordant process? Is politics viewed as legit-
imate representation of interests or a,series of -struggles for supremacy~ 
Finally, is there a level of civility in political.interaction, or is 
there a degree to whi.ch more or less. formal norms of courtesy ten,d to 
bd h h f 1 . . 1 d' ?11 su ue t e roug ness o po 1t1ca isagreements 
The term "dominant" implies that; thei:e presently e:x;ists, a fragmen-
ted political· cul.ture, and that this_ fragmentation creates an environment 
10:Lucien Pye and Sidney Verba, Political Cul,ture\and Politi~l 
Development.(Princeton, 1965), p. 513. 
11 Almond and Powell, pp. 54-57. 
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in which the political·system can not peJ;"fonn its necessary functions, 
in that the ethn~c and/or.regional interests counteract its efforts. 
Methodology, Organization, and Justification 
A case study focusing on the symbolic capability of the single-
party political system provides the framework of analysis f<:>r this 
thesis. The symbolic capability of the party system, or the image that 
it produces, is a reflection ,of how the population identifies with the 
central authority. At the heart of ·this process lies the notion of 
legitimacy. L~gitimacy of a,political system implies that "there is a 
set of .attitudes and.values associated with .it which support the politi-
cal authority. 1112 The significance of a·high symbolic capability of a 
nation should nqt be,underestimatep• It is through the creation and 
exploitation of a set of symbols that political.leaders are able to gain 
acceptance of their pol~cies, although they may be agonizing and un-
popular. 
The symbolic capability is difficult to measure, "but polH:ical 
elites (and journalists and scholars) often attempt to do so.by counting 
crowds and auqiences. 1113 Survey research would aid in.the measurement; 
however, this would be. impossible to . do because it is. not· feasible to 
travel ·to Zaire for that purpose. Als.o, there .are not ·enough ;laireans 
in the United States to provide an.adequate sample. Pata such as the 
crime rate, nUI!).ber of political prisoners, and number of political exe-
cutions can be used. .A.lso, the acceptance of the party policies by 
12christian P. Patholm, Four.African Political Syst~s (Englewood 
Cliffs, 1970), p. 25. 
13 Almond and Powell, .. p. 19.9. 
other institutions in the state, such as the church, media, ,,and univer-
sities, can be determined by.reading the literature produced by these 
institutions. 
To gather this type of information a content analysis pf pertinent 
essays in periodicals such as Africa Today, Foreign Affairs, and Orbis, 
will be utilized. Also, Department of State and numerous intelligence 
documents to which the writer is privy will be used. 14 Other sources, 
such as articles from The New York Times and Armed Forces Press Clips 
will als,o be used. 
Chapter Two is an examination of the structure of leadership and 
8 
its orientation toward a dominant political c4lti,ire at.the time of inde-
pendence. An analysis of the organization and functioning of the polit-
ical system will be made tp determine the degree to which progress was 
maqe toward stabilizi~g a political order that was oriented, toward a 
national political.culture that transcended the ethnic groupings within 
the state. We know that this. system failed; thus, this analysis will 
focus on why a national political cultur.e did not .evolve. 
The third chapter of ·.this study examines the rise to ppwer of the 
new leadership whieh organized the MPR subsequent to its creation in 
1967. The regime is sustained by military and police power. Through 
the activities of the government: and the MPR a determined campaign has 
been made to legitimize the political system. A careful analysis of 
the behavior of political leadership, the government, anq the .MPR will 
be made in terms of the problem of generating a dominant political· 
culture. 
14 Documents such as Centrai intelligence Agency, Military Assis-
tance and Advisory Groups, Ambassador reports. Any information classi-
fied Secret will not be used. 
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The fourth and final chapter will consist of the conclusions. Al-
thol.lgh this study may not present clear-cut answers or solutions.to 
Zaire's political·problems, it does provide a basis for one,to know what 
to expect anq what to praise or criticize when one looks.at Zairean 
politics. 
The choice of Zaire as the topic of study is not a chance select.ion. 
It results from the writer's acquaintance with the.area and from the 
writer'. s interest in . an apparently growing trend of single..-party poli ti-
cal systems in sub-Saharan Africa. With the coming of independence·for 
the Portuguese colonies, the nearing national electipns in Nigeria, and 
the recent coup d'etat in Ethiopia, this list will continue to grow. 
Zaire .in the past, anq at present, has played an active role.in the 
politics of Africa. If .the MPR and President Mobutu succeed in their 
attempt to create national unity in Zaire, then their model.may offer 
possible solutions to the other African·states that are afflicted with 
cµltural and ethnic fragmentation • 
• 
CHAPTER II 
ANATOMY OF LEADERSHIP 
For any observer of the Congolese political scene significant 
changes have taken place since General Mobutu took control of the gov-
ernment in November, 1965. A period of insecurity and uncertainty has 
been replaced by.a period of relative stability which has been used to 
reshape the state apparatus. The previous decentralized structure has. 
been replaced by a centralized regime; and the professional politician 
has been replaced by the "young expert". This chapter focuses on the 
initial leadership, i.e., individuals or groups that exercised a sig-
nificant amount of political power; How they reacted to the specific 
events that occurred; Why they acted as they did; and their eventual 
failure in attempting to create a national political culture. The 
factors considered in this analysis include the origin of the leaders 
(their geographic origin and education), their political orientations, 
and their political roles and. styles. 
Origins of the Leadership Structure 
In examining the leadership of the Congo in its initial five years 
of independence one recognizes almost immediately that the most success-
ful leaders have come from Leopoldyille (Kinshasa). 1 Joseph Kas~vubu, 
1The names of cities, provinces, and the state will be used inter-
changeably depending on the time factor. 
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Cyril Adoula, Justin Bombako, and Albert Kalondji had all been located 
in the capital for a number of years. Only a few indiyiduals·from the 
"outside" had had any influence in Congolese political affairs. 
11 
The most notable of these was Patrice Lumumba, the first premier of 
the country. His influence, however, lasted only a brief three mont:J:is. 
One of the most.significant factors in pis downfall was his inability to 
gain any significant degree of support in the city of Leopoldville . 
itself. 2 
The aspirant leaders from thct outlying province.a faced a. difficult 
choice in the selection of the.political arena.they hoped to enter. If 
they chose the national arena, this would mean prolonged.absences from 
their home, ·which in tur:q. would mean that their personal base of power 
would become erpded and others would rise as replacements. Also, the 
lack of a close network of old·colleagues and ethnically related persons 
in Leopoldville made the.exercise of power, in the national arena, very 
difficult. Both, Lumumba and Christophe Gbenye provi4ed interesting ex-:" 
amples pf this phenomenon •. Both were.at: their zenith of power.in 
Orientale province. The case of Lumumba.was discussed above, but Gbenye 
provides an even better example. In 1959, he became the assistant·mayor 
of Stanleyville, and in 19,60, he moved to the top position of the city 
from which he exercised considerable influence throughout the province. 
After .t~e death of Lumumba~ he was pne of the leaders who established 
the "Provisional Government. of the Congo" at Stanleyville, and was 
elected to take Lumumba's place as leader.of the Mouvement National 
Congolais (MNC), one of the most powerful political parties in the 
2crawford Young, Politics in the.Congo (Princeton, 1965), p. 386. 
Congo. When the United Nations appointed Cyril Adoula as the new 
Premier in the government of reconciliation, one of the conditions of 
support for Adoula by the Lumumbists was the inclusion of Gbenye as 
Minister of the Interior. Once in Leopoldville, Gbenye found that he 
was not able to use the powers of his ministry; indeed, he discovered 
that he had been. under virtual arrest by the Chief of the Security 
Police. At the ,same· time; Dominique Kehleko, assistant. mayor under 
Gbenye, became the mayor of Stanleyville and emerged as the dominant 
fi~ure in Orientale province thus Gbenye had lost on both counts. 3 
12 
On the other hand, leaders from provinces such as Kwilu or Bas-Congo 
could become involved at the national level while still retaining their 
local power bases. r<.asavubu was probably the most well-known illustra-
tion. Having his origin.in Bas-Congo, Kasavubu became the leader of the 
Bakongos. In 1953, when he took over the leadership of the.Alliance des 
Bakongo (ABAKO), originally a cultural association. it became the polit-
ical party that Kasavubu used for his rise to the Presidency. In 1957, 
Kasayubu was elected mayor of Leopoldville and in 1960 he became the 
first President of the Congo. He ,not only remained the President until· 
the Mobutu take-over, but he also cont~nued to serve .as head of the 
ABAKO until the party was declared illegal in November 1965. 4 
Political Orientations 
The political orientations of the initial leadership structure can 
3Pierre Artigue, These Are the Congolese Leaders.(Brussels, 1963), 
pp. 123-125. 
4Rene Lemarchand, Political Awakening in the Belgian Congo 
(Berkley, 1964), p. 202. 
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be illustrated by the positipn and activities of three individuals, each 
representing a different type of orientation. l'he·first described, is 
Albert Kalondji, the ·caricature of traditionalism. The·secpnd is Joseph 
Kasavubu, a man who used both· tradition and Wester~ orieQtations to 
preserve his position. The third ex;ample is Patrice Lumumba, a man who 
gave up his tribal prientations and became an.arde'Q.t nationa,list. 
The case of Albe'I'.t Kal:-ondji must be mentionecJ in any analysis of. 
the leadership of the ·Congo. It is .someYfhat iron:i,.c that a man with a 
good education and a long association with Western political orienta-
~ions would deliberately bec(i>me a traditionalist. Kalondji was born 
into the Baluba tribe ,in Ka~ai province. His fathei;-, being a.Catholic, 
opened the doors for his son! .s education in the Catholic primary schools. 
When he showed remarkable intellec,tual, curiosity, the mission priests 
placed him in the·Sainte-Marie secondary.school.where he completed his 
secondary education. ' He was aclmitted to Lovanium University where he 
graduated in 1956. When the Congo became independent, he w~s one.of 
5 
only 17 individuals of Congolese o+igin .who haµ a college education •. 
In 1957, Kalondji.was elected ·to the Kasai Provincial Council, and 
soon became knpwn,for hi~ radical statements against the colonial ad-
ministraU6n.. In 1958, he joined the MNC; because of his nationalist 
views, however, he disagreed with Lumumba' s "personal rule'' of the party. 
In July, 1959, he and other intellectuals, such as Cyril Ad,oula, Joseph 
Ileo, and Joseph Ngalula who disagreed with Lumumba's actions, set up 
their own.moderate wing of the MNC• This party rapidly became known.as 
the MNC-Kalondji. 6 Kaloncl.ji rapidly ,transformed, this new wing of the 
5Internationa1 Fides Services (Rome, January 24, 1967). 
6 Artigue, p. 128. 
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party into a Baluba ethnic party. Instead of appointing the,intellec-
tuals to the top posts within the party, he installed ~hree Baluba 
chieftains as the principal leaders. Although this in itself did not 
transform the new wing into. an ethnic party, the subsequent actions of 
the MNC-Lumumba did. After Kalondj i .. named the . three chieftains to 
positions of authority, the Lumumba wing of the party began to back the 
Lulua tribe in its cqnflict with the Balubas. 
The historic circumstances of this conflict are worth a brief 
counnent. at this point not only because they help illµstrate Kalondji's 
actions, but also because this conflict and others like it prevented .the 
establishment of a dominant political.culture. Historic .facts point out 
tha~ until the European penetration there were no cultural or linguistic 
differences between the Baluba or the Lulua. The name Lulua was appar-
ently adopted by the German explorer Von.Wissmann about 1885 to desig-
nate a group of Baluba living. on the west bank of the Lulua River. In 
brief, as Professor Lemarchand points out: 
what we have here is a new "tribe" which was born after 1885 
in the same way most tJ;ibes are born; they came to be re-
garded as cultural-ly different.among themselves and by other 
tribes, and they expressed their differences by a tribal. 
name. Thus, even though both groups actually share the same 
cultural features, their consciousness of belonging to 
different tribes is what lies at the root of their mutual 
antagonisms.7 · 
The basic conflict arose.out of the Baluba migrations into what 
were accepted as traditional Lulua lands. The .Baluba were then thought 
of as the ''Usurpers" of territory. Also, because of the. willingness to 
accept the Western philosophies, they quickly adapted to the colonial 
system and as a result had a virtual monopoly of the available clerical 
7 Lemarchand, Political Awakening in the Belgian Congo, p. 206. 
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jobs. It was the increasing fear of the Lulua of being dominated by the 
"Usurper" that they organized the Association Ltilua,...Freres in 1952. Al-
though this organization diq,not bring about any significant changes, it 
instilled the basic tribal cleavages into the Lulua, and competition 
between the two tribes came to be viewed as a life and death struggle. 
Between July and December, 1959, tribal fighting broke out. The Lulua 
engaged in what they felt was a fight for supremacy and they became 
ruthless in their.actions. 
They went on a path of terror and violence; huts were burned, 
farmers chased from their.land, families molested ancl men 
were killed. The Association Lulua-Freres transformed into 
an atavistic-cum-terroristic organization. Armed raids became 
more frequent, and the resulting casualties more numerous.a 
Although most Congolese leaders made use of traditional symbols to 
communicate with .the mass, Kalondji carried this to the point of obscur-
antism. It was.because of the ethnic.conflict between the Baluba and 
Lulua, the S'Qpport of the MNC-L for the Lulua, and his own ethnic 
origins that Kalondji transformed his political party into an ethnic and 
9 
superstitious messianic movement. A leading. intellectual and Foreign 
Minister, from April to December, 1963, Mabiko-Kalanda described in 
these terms Kalondji 1 s manipulation of superstition and politics to 
influence mass opinion. 
Kalondji declared that he had returned from the Council of 
Legislation session in Belgium with independence "physically" 
in his pocket. The Belgians, he said, had done everything 
to prevent his return; he had been thrown-out of the plane 
into the Atlantic Ocean with a stone tied around his neck. 
8Antoine Rubbens, "Political Awakening in the Belgian Congo," 
Civilizations, X, No. 1 (1960), p. 66. 
9 From an unpublished discussion with Donald Morris, author of The 
Washing of the Spears, and retired C.I.A. Chief--Zaire. 
But his magic power had been too strong for the Belgians, 
and he had been able. to safely return to his peop+e •10 
The second type of leadership orientation is exhibited by Joseph 
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Kasavubu. Born in 1913 into the Bakongo tribe, Kasayubu was thought of 
as the elder statesman of the Congo.· He used a combination of tradi-
tional and Western orientations.to secure his position as both President 
of the Congo and leader of the Bakongo people. On the one hand, · 
Kasavubu displayed tradition~! authority to influence the pol~tic~l 
perspectives ·of the Bakongo. The values identified with Kasavubu's 
personality are deeply rooted. in the traditional authority structure of 
the Congo. The Bakongo show a wide measure of deference and esteem. 
toward their traditional leaders. It was this theme that "King Kasa" 
used to maintain his place as the Bako,ngo leader. He also used a reli-
gious,dimension to establish his c~arismatic political personality. For 
example, in late 1959, pict.ures were circulated throughout Bakongo 
country showing Peter giving the,keys of independence to Kasavubu.+1 
A Western orientation is reflected in Kasavubu's belief that the 
Congo should remain intac~ and.to achieve this, modern integrated 
12 governmental structures had to be developed. At the same time, the 
people were given a voice in the decision-making process. Further, he 
believed that a strong states-:rights system had to be.adopted because· 
the Congo was so ethnically divided. He could not forget the basic 
cornerstone of the ABAKO party, which was Bakongo ethnic nationalism. 
10unpublished lecture, given at the Congolese Institute of Poli-
tics, Leopoldville, June 8, 1962. 
11 Young, Politics in the Congo, p. 391. 
12Ibid., pp. 390-391. 
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The third type of leader that displayed another political orienta-
tion was Patrice Lumumba. · Lumumba was born into a Catholic family in 
1925, though his family belonged t:o the.Batatola.tribe. He received a 
Catholic primary education an<l in,1943, moved to Stanleyville where he 
became employed as clerk by the Symetain Company. The fact that he had 
not received a formal education beyond.the primary level did not prevent 
him from writing and publishing about.the poli~ical and social environ-
ment as he observed it. Lumumba's material emphasized problems of 
racial, social, an,d economic discrimination. In 1956, he ent.ered the 
political arena. Unlike other politicians who tended to use their.tribal 
association as a means of a~cess to the political arena, Lumumba ~ntered 
politics through broadly based associations. In 1951, he became a member 
of the Association des.Postiers de la Province Orientale (APIPO), a 
' ' 
professional organization •• In 1953, he. was elected to the post.of vice-
chairman of the .Associa ti.on des Anciens Elev es des Peres d,e Scheu t 
(Adapes); and in 1955, he was chairman of both the Association des. 
Evolues, and the.Association du Personnel Indigen,e de.la Colonie (APIC). 
Then finally, in 1956, he,,founqed both the Amaties Belgo-Congolaises and, 
Amicale Liberale de Stanleyville. These were cultural organizations 
which included Africans and Europeans as members. He hoped that.these 
would give him a base·of support for his denunciations of .the colonial 
h . . 13 aut or1t1es. 
Lumumba was firmly committed to.Congolese nationalism; and he saw 
a·difference between what he termed "true" and "false" nationalism: 
A man witho~t any national,.ist tendencies is a man.without 
a soul. What we must avoid in our country is false 
13 Lemarchand, Political Awaken,ing in the Congo., pp. 198-200 • 
nationalism, the cramped nationalism that conceals forms of 
racialism and hatred for those of another race. This 
struggle.against racialist nationalis~4can be effectiye only 
if we are able to abolish its causes. ·· 
Lumumba's nat:i.onalism stemmed from different sources. His origin in a 
tribe who.se value system had been affected by Arab influences, his 
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career as a clerk in the Manienma, and his move tq Stanleyville all con-
15 tribu ted to eroding his tribal loyalty. · Also, one must remember that 
he became engaged in poli.tics in the post-war period when nationalist 
ideas were affecting the political imagination of many African leaders. 
Additionally, a visit to Belgium in 1956 brought him into contact with a 
new environment and had a profound impact on his attitude. On his return 
he commented: 
I am most, anxious that. a. large number of Congolese elites be 
allowed to e:wlore the mot}J.er country, people who can profit 
by the experience of getting to know the Belgians and can. 
return to pass on this experience to their own people.16 
Finally, the fact that he .had served a prison sentence at the hands of 
the colonial authorities predisposed him to a radical orientation. 
The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from this rapid description 
is that this rather perp·lexing picture reflects in part the complete 
absence of previous political training, and the absence of agreement on 
the part of the Congolese elites as to what type of governmental struc-
tures should be established to assist .in creating a dominant political 
culture. In fact just the opposite occurred. One of the striking 
aspects of this situation was the tendency of the Congolese politicians 
14Patrice Lumumba, Congo: . My Country (New York, 1962), p. 173. 
15R.ene Lemarchand, "Patrice Lumumba: A Political Post-Mortem?", 
Africa Report, 31 (February, 1961), pp. 13-14. 
16 Lumumba, p. 42. 
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to seek power.through whatever means were ayailable. Thus, the ·poli-
ticians. used the.ir own tribes as stepping-stones to positions of· 
leadership. As they foresaw their position of their group of origin in 
the context of an independent na~ion-state, they also foresaw the real 
threat of "tribal domination" thus tl}e politicians, began.to seek any 
alliance that could offset this threat. 
The•Leadership Strµcture 
The political styles and roles played by the .leadership give in-. 
sight 'in~o the nature of the political process and the place of the 
political, sector within it. The leader:ship structure of the Congo, in 
the early stages before independence and immediately after ·independence, 
can be.characterized by its patrimonial political style. Literature 
dealing with politic~l\leader~ of the newer states tend,s to emphasize 
this type of poli·ti.cal. styl~. This liJre.rature generally focuses .on the 
national level. 17· In the ·Congo, howevell', this patrimonial type leader.,.. 
ship took place at the lower. levels of polHica,l '·action. Only Lumumba 
can be said to be in the ·patrimonial tradition on.the national level. 
Max Weber describes patrimonialism in the following manner: 
The organized, group e~ercising authority is ,primarily based on .. 
relations of personal loyalty, cultivated through a common 
process of education. · The pe+s.on eJ!:ercising authority is not 
a 'superioI'' but a ·personal 'chief'. Hifi! administrative staff. 
does not consist of officials but of personal ret:,ainers. Those 
are either his traditional comrades or his subjects. What 
17Aristide R. Zolber~, Creating Political Order: The Party States 
of West Africa (Chicago, 1966); Gue.nthur Rath, -"Personal Rulership, 
Patri~onialism and Empire-building i:n , tpe New States," World Politi.cs, 
XX (1968); and Claude-E. Welch, Military Roles and Rule (North Scituate, 
1974). . 
determines the relations of the administrative staff ·to the 
chief is not impersonal obligations of office but personal 
loyalty to the 'chief'.18 
In the .Congo, a similar pattern of relationships emerged from the 
tribalization and regiona.lhation of the political l:i,.fe that occurred 
after independence.. A few words about tribalism are necessary before 
continuing. Much of present day literature concerning the new states 
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has conceived the relation .between tribalism and nationalism as two ends 
of the "tradition-modernity." Tribalism, in an anthropological sense, 
is defined as being a state of backwardness. However, there is a dif-
ference between this "old" terlI). and the newer one. Modern tribalism 
lacks both.the strict kinship relation determined by time .and generation 
and the narrow and ill-defined ecological dimensions that characterize 
the old term. Modern tribalism involves. a much more extensive set of 
relations than the . old ne.twork of kinship ties. The most striking 
Congolese.example of this change is found among the Bangala, a name that 
was created by the Belgian authorities to iqentify people living in a 
large circular region .around Leopoldyille which included parts of the 
provinces of Kasai, Bandundu, Equateur, and Kongo-Central. Bakongo, at 
the.time of independence, referred to all non-Bakongo as Bangala and the 
term came to be used to identify the Kassians, Mongo, and Kwilu 
19 peoples. 
This new form of tribalism is a recent phenomenon. The ethnic 
rivalries that developed must be.understood as competition among certain 
18 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New 
York, 1957), p. 341. 
191 . 1 B hl ucien . evy- ru , 
pp. 201-210. 
The Primative Mentality (Paris, 1965), 
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groups or communities for modern objects. 
'tribal awakening developed along with decolonization,in an environ-
ment of intense politicization. Initially, the Bakongo were the first 
to awake, "and become the. most modernized ethnic group in the country. 1120 
Their political radicalism crune·from the fear of being overrun in the 
competition for power with the Bangala. Thus, ABAKO (Alliance of the 
Bakongo) was created. Initially it served as a cultural society, but 
later was ·transformed by Kasavubu into a political party to protect the 
interests of the Bakongo. The reaction of the Bangala elite, of course, 
was to establish their own organization, Parti Solidaire Africain (PSA). 
Th.is pattern of competition also prevailed in Kasai province among the 
leadership of the Baluba.and their rivals, the Balulua. At the time of 
independence this pattern.had so prevailed that the Congo was saturated 
with more than 150 political parties or associations, each of them being 
21 
constituted as a reaction against "others." This political phenomenon 
of ethnicity was ev:entually institutionalized by the division of the 
country into 22 provinces, each representing a major tri~e. This 
formation was not only the result of general ethnic awakening b4t, also, 
of development of individual loyalties and allegiances around a leader-
ship structure that fired ethnic arid regional identification •. 
Therefore, the political center of power in the Congo did not rest. 
on a single legitimate focus of authority. Instead, legitimacy rested 
with the regionai and ethnic leaders. After February, 1961, political 
20Area Handbook for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Washing.,.. 
ton D.C., 1971), p. 75. 
21crawford Young, "Congo Political Parties Rev:i.sited," Africa 
Report, Vol.. 8 (August, 1963), p. 15. 
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decisions were made by a series of conferences or "round table" discus-
sions that were attended only by the .most.powet;"ful leaders. It was at 
these conferences that the leaders attempted to transform their indi-
vidual "suzerainties" into provinces or states. The central government 
had .no legitimacy of its own;. it was, in fact, a creation of the United 
Nations.' officials, backed by a loose coqlition of tribal leaders who 
h d i . d . h . nd bl d 0 • 22 a part cipate in t e var+ous rou ta e iscussions. 
Another structural charact;eristic of patrimoniaU.sm is its· large 
use of coercive organization-'"'."~ilitary or paramilitary fo.rces--by the 
rulers to preserve .their respective positions. Weber drew special 
attention to the social organizatioq. of the military .force that enabled 
a patrimoniql ruler t;o preserve his powe:r. He distinguished five types 
of military organization: 1) an army, composed of personal subordinates 
to whom the ruler has assignee! rewards. in return for ~ervices or pay-
ments in kind; 2) a force composed of people who are entirely.separated 
from the society; 3) an .army based on recruitment of .alien mercenaries; 
4) an army composed of alien people to whom the ruler has granted some 
rewards for .their military service; 5) a personal m~litary force re-
23 
cruited among the ruler's own subjects. · 
The National Congolese Army.(~C) was, at independence, of the 
second type, due to the history of its forerunner, the former Force 
Publique. Belgian policies of isolating the military from its immediate. 
surroundings and using a draft system that included people from all the 
22 Stanley Hoffman, "In Search of a Thread: · The .. UN .in the Congo 
Labyrinth," International. Organization, XVI, No •. 2. (Spring, 1962), 
pp. 341-342. 
23Reinhardt Ben4iJc, Max Weber: An Intell~ctual Portra~t (New York, 
1962), pp. 341-344. 
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various ethnic groups made the old Force PubU.que . one of the most inte-
grated, feared, and repressive forces throughout Africa. At inqepen-
dence, however, this integrated military force collapsed. The ANC ·could 
ri.ot withstand "harassment by political leaders who attempt:ed to find 
support among soldiers drawn from their own region. 1124 In other worqs,. 
there was a shift from a military force of type two to private or tribal 
armies of type five. 
Within eight months after independence, the ANC had broken into four 
fragments: 1) the "J?iamond State" Army, organized by."Emperor" Albert 
Kalonj i. This army was composed almost entirely of Baluba. troops. 
2) The army of the secessionist ~atanga created by and controlled by 
Moise Tshombe. This army was c~mposeq of Bayeke and Balunda warriors 
and a body of white mercenaries recruited from Europe, South Africa, and 
Rhodesia. 3) The National Congolese Army of Stanleyville directed by 
former ANC officers and comprised mainly of members of the Batetela and 
Basuku tribes. This army .was controlled by Antione Gizenga and the 
"spirit of Lumumba." 4) The National Congolese Army of Leopoldville 
consisted of most of the old Force Publique and was loyal to its 
commander-in-chief, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Mobutu. In addition to 
these four major segments, each "suzerain" controlled parandli tary 
forces that were used as private bodyguards to help police his province. 
Taken individually these thr.ee variables may not have brought about 
the failure of the leadership to create a national political culture; 
when combined, they produced an environment that resulted in ethnic 
24Jean-Claude Willame, "The Provinces of the Congo,~! Collections of 
Politics, 1, 4 (August, 1967), p. 74. 
rivalry, regionalism, and secessionism, therby making it impossible to 
develop any type of a,national political culture. 
24 
CHAPTER III 
THE SECOND POLITICAL GENERATION 
In discussing the secon4 political generation of Zaire and the 
success it has gained in stabilizing the country, one must first look at 
the rise to power of a new set of leaders, that is, the development of 
the new political elite and their take-over of the governmental proces-
ses. Secondly, one must look at the differences in the leadership 
structure and the attitudes of the new leaders. And finally, one must 
look at the policies that the new generation .has instituted in t~eir 
attempt at generating a dominant political culture in Zaire. This will 
include the "Policy of Authenticity", its foundations, and its implemen..-
tEJ.tion. 
Breaking Point: The Rise of a New 
Political Leadership 
The rebellion .of 1964-65 represents the turning point between the 
first and second political generations in Zaire, In.the volatile en-
vironment generated by the patrimonial type of government, a basic 
weakness was brought to the point of open warfare. The system of tribal 
and ethnic patronage created enclaves of prosperity and further widened 
the gap between the elites and their followers and the masses. This 
pattern generally followed the form of opposition between the towns and 
the .rural surroundings. During the. colonial period, Zaire was one of 
25 
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the most industrialized countries of Africa. 1 From 1950 through 1959, 
over 59 percent of the male population was employed in commercialized 
production and at that time agriculture, mining activities, and other 
industries represented respectively 44.6, 19.7, and 34.6 percent of the 
2 total production of goods. After 1960, although little information on 
actual, agricultural production exists, export statistics indicate that 
rural peasant partic~pation in the economy fell off drastically. For 
example, the production of bananas, rice, and palm oil, the most common 
crops produced and consumed by the rural community, dropped from 30,000 
3 to 13,000 tons respectively between 1960 and 1964. Thus, in many re-
spects the rural areas returned to subsistence. Schools, hospitals, and 
welfare institutions either ceased to function or moved to the towns 
during the 1960-1964 time frame. 
During this same period, political frustrations increased. Between 
1961 and 1964, Zaire was ruled by the "suzerains" and their series of 
Round Table Conferences, This created the tendency on the part,of the 
power elite to disregard the rights and demands of the:political minori-
ties. Many nationalist leaders and followers of Lumumba were forced 
into exile in neighboring countrieE! where they formed "governments of 
national-liberation." In 1964, when the Kwilu Uprising started, many of 
these former leaders returned, notably Christopher Gibenye and Antoine 
1Agen~y For International Development, Congo, Kinshasa (October, 
1970), Revision No. 248, p. 8. 
2united Nations Statistical Yearbook, 1971 (New York, 1972), 
pp. 250-298. 
3rbid. 
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4 Gizen,ga, and quickly changed this uprising into a full sea.le civil war. 
At the beginning of 1965, two-thirds of Zaire was in the hands of the 
insurgents. 
But from this time until.November 1965, neither they nor their 
leaders could gain a significant victory. The leaders of the rebellion, 
lacking leadership capacities and any revolution~ry plans and perspec-
tive, lost their strength as soon as they attempted further expansion. 
At the same time, the "profess:l,.onal politic:l,.ans" who controlled the 
government, unable to understand that they were not the victims but the 
object of the .rebellion, continued to play the:l,.r "game of politics. 115 
Duri11g all of this, changes occurred within the ANC, which at the time 
went unnoticed, but they were changes that we~e of immense consequen~e. 
The most important changes in the ANC were threefold: 1) Military 
retraining, 2) The rise of a new military elite, and 3) The new technical 
capacity of the ANC. The process of retra:l,.ning began with the mutiny of 
the Force Publique in July, 1960. This revolt brought an immediate 
Africanization of the officer corps. The sold,iers dismissed their white 
officers and elect.ed their own leaders. Recourse to this 4nusual proce-
dure had many risks, since the new officers drew their authority from the 
soldiers, who could without warning withdraw their support; "In fact, 
only the semiautomatic reflex of obeying superior officers and the hesi-
tation of troops to use their new power preventel an era of anarchy. 116 
4GIST (Washington ,n,c., 1972), pp. 3-4. 
5 Department of State, Update: Republic of Zaire (Washington ·D.C., 
1974), pp. 7-8. Classification Secret. This information.consists of 
five paragraphs that were not classified. 
6rbid, p. 9. 
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Command of this new army was taken-over by the former sergeants who 
succeeded in imposing. authority upon the ranks wj,thout great difficulty. 
As the institutional and political mechanisms 1.lnder civilian 
control became ineffective, the army emerged as the sole·force of rela-
tive unity. From this point~of-view, the army benefited.from Belgian 
policy which had avoided introducing tribal differentiations into the 
Force Publique. It also profited from the communications network that 
had been built by the European officers; this als.o contribut·ed to the · 
rapid progression of the mutiny across the country. 
Outside sources also contributed to the retraining of .the army. In 
November, 1960, the United States, Belgium, France, Israel, Italy, and 
Great Britain signed agreements with the Congolese government to a~sist 
in the retraining and equipping of the ANC. The·European.countries gave 
or sold airplanes, tan~s, artillery, and small arms, while the United 
7 States and Israel sent advisors to begin the retraining process. 
The unity of the army was far from being fully realized, however. 
Despite the continued propaganda of the army command attempting to sspa-
rate the military from politics, the ANC could never escape external 
solicitations until the Mobutu .coup d'etat in 1965. From 1960 to 1962, 
the ANC was split into four rival groups, as was previously mentioned .• 
These divisions.cut heavily into the army's morale, especially when the 
rebel troops were re-int~grated at their former ranks when the various 
secessionist movements were.ended. Added to these external divisions, 
there were also internal divisions. Tensions that resulted from tbe · 
creation of an elite group within the army--the Israeli trained 
7 Ernest W. Lefever, Spe.ar and Scepter (Washin~ton D.C., 1972), 
Appendix 5, pp. 226-229. 
8 paracommandos became the praetorian guard of General.Mobutu. 
Howe'Ver, despite these forces of disintegration, the ANC demon-
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strated an.espirit de corps that contrasted with the factionalism that 
prevailed in politics. The military, after they had put their own ho~se 
in order, felt a profound scorn for politicians and the civilians whQm 
they consiqered directly responsible for the political crisis. In 
General Mobutu's own words: 
Unlike the.army which has been.able to reoFganize itself, the 
political sphere remains corrupt, unstable, and irrational. 
The political crisis was completely in .the realm of politics 
••• Political·. leaders indQlged in a series of. sterile strug-
gle$ for public off:i,.ce without considering the welfare of·the 
citizens9of this country. The politicians, have ruined this 
country. 
The, second s~ries of changes within the ANC came from the rise of a 
::·.:·~~,; 
new military· elite. Immediately following the mutiny of the Force 
Publique, a small group of sergeants tQok-:-pve:r; the .command of the ANC. 
This group formed the nucleus. of the High Command of the ANC. In ,addb 
tion to this geqeration, who had been.trained unQ.er.the princi;ples of 
the old Force Publique; a new group of.officers.and noncommissioned 
officers emerged. A large number of these qad been sent abroad·to re-
ceive their training. 
In September, 1964, 664 officers and noncommissioned officers 
benefited from highe:i:- training 'in ~elgian military schools. 
At the same time 276 officers.continued the~r training in. 
Belgium and the Uniteq States.. These. f:i,.gures are particula+-
ly significant when one realizes that the Congolese army in'\ 
eluded only 13,08 officers and noncomm!ssioneq officers in 19.64 •10 
811Zaire," African Digest, 19 .(August, 1972), pp. 82-84. 
911President Mobutu's. Message to the ANC," Translations. on Africa, 
No. 42118 (February, 1966), p. 299. 
lO"External Aid to the Republic of the Congo," Congolese·Stuqies, 
IX, No. 3 (19.66), 1-36, p. 21.. 
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This new generation differed a great deal from the preceding one. 
The older generation "were practitioners of armed struggle, without.ex-
tensive training; 1111 the new generation received training on.a signifi-
cantly higher level in .the various military academies. Tensions between 
these two groups have surfaced over such things as slow promotions and 
low pay, however, the two groups complemented each other in dealing with 
the internal problems that faced the Congo. 
Finally, the technical capacity of the ANC had grown until it was 
equipped with some of the most modern armaments in Africa. The Congo 
benefited from a vast amount of foreign aid. The United Nations' 
command reorganized the Congolese army .. Belgium, the United States, 
Israel, Great Britain, and Italy contributed to the new operational 
groups of the ANC, including such military items as a tactical air force, 
air transport, river patrol boats, communications and the like. In June 
1964, American and Belgian aid was $6.1 million .and $L27 million re-
. 1 12 spective y. 
Taking all of these factors into account., the army lacked only an 
excuse to intervene in the political life of the country. 
The New Leadership 
The professional politicians, as usual, offered.the excusethat was 
needed for General Mobutu to step in. In keeping with the factionalism 
that had been created by the political parties and their leaders, the 
national elections scheduled for March, 1966 produced political 
11Ibid.' p. 22. 
12 Agency For International Development, p. 7. 
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stagnation and the threat of Katangan seccession again surfaced. 
Kasavubu and Tshombe were attempting to outma~euver each other and in 
the process the charges of regionalism and tribalism had brought a halt 
to·the development of nationa,l institutions concerned with the operation 
of the government. On November 25, 1965, General Mobutu announced that 
he had deposed President Kasavubu and that he had assumed the presidency 
himself. Mobutu stated: 
The race for power is over. By Saturday Colonel Mulamba will 
have formed a Government of Nationa.l Uni.on. It will be ap-
proved by acclamation in Parliament ••• You have all been able 
to see that our politicians have failed utterly. This is not 
a military coup d'etat; the Army is merely taking up its re-
sponsibilities towards the country.13 
The coup d'etat clearly brought about basic changes in the.leader-
ship structure of Zaire. And, though the ANC remains the central ele-
ment of support, new strata have emerged whose political importance did 
not matter before. 
Describing this new leadership and its attempts at creating a 
dominant political culture is not simple. However, one thing is clear: 
the military intervention of General Mobutu has not led to a military 
regime, in the sense that the government is directly controlled by the 
military. In the beginning Mobutu seemed to act as the direct emanation 
of the military High Command. In .its name, he declared himself President 
for a period of five years. Also, the junta seemed to be substantiated. 
by three facts: 1) the naming of military officers as the head of 
regions.that continued to have political tensions; 2) the use of mili-
tary courts in cases that had previously been conducted by civil courts; 
and 3) the use of the military in symbolic operations such as "Return to 
13Keesings Contemporary Archives (London, 1965), p. 2ll37A. 
14 the Land" and "Operation Roll Up Our Sleeves." 
After six months, however, Mobutu began to stand apart from the 
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army and particularly the High Command. In October, 1966, Mobutu defined 
the proper role,of the military as "an organism of execution operating 
in. a strictly military cont.ext, not a pressure group or a political 
15 
assembly." In the provinces, military commissioners were replaced by 
civil authorities. The military courts were disbanded, and the symbolic 
use of the army came to an end. Mobutu began to seek an alternative 
pattern of government to supplant the ineffectual.patrimonial system. 
Between April, 1966, and July, 1967, the Mobutu regime can best be 
described in,the words of Jean-Claude Willame as a "caesarist bureau-
16 
cracy. '' As such, it includes four ·basic features of a pure bureau-
cracy as described by Weber: 
1) Official business tends to be conducted more and more on a 
continuous basi9 ••. 2) It is conducted in relative secrecy by 
experts and in accordance with stipulated rational rules ••• 
3) Officials' responsibilities and authority are part of a 
centralized hierarchy of authority .•• 4) Officials and other 
administrative employees do not own the resources ~ecessary 
for the performances of their assigned functions. 1 
In this analysis of rational legal authority, Weber was concerned 
with the relationship betwe~n the struggl~ for power and the trend 
toward bureaucratization. He believed that some equilibrium must be. 
1411Mobutu Stirs Discontent in the Congo With ,Austerity Programs," 
The New York Times (February 18, 1966), col. 4, p. 8. These programs 
were aimed at,cleaning up the big cities, and returning unemployed city 
inhabitants to rural areas. 
15Deadline Data on World Affairs (October 26, 1966), p. 209. 
16Jean-Claude Willame, "Toward A Caesarist Bureaucracy," Afric~ 
Today, Vol. 40 (January, 1971), p. 130. 
17 Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, pp. 330-
332. 
maintained between them. A failure to achieve this balance meant that 
bureaucracy had usurped, political decision-making or "all problems of 
politics are turned into problems of administration. 18 This trend 
toward "depoliticization", at the same time emphasizing public office, 
hierarchy, and centralization was basic during this l~ month span of 
time. Not only was the politician .designated as being evil, but poli-
. . lf b h . 'l 19 tics itse ecame t e main evi . The following discussion of deci-
sions and even.ts confirms this trend. 
One of the first acts President Mobutu issued ¥as to limit the 
autonomy of parliamentary institutions. Although the parliament was 
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allowed to continue, the five year state of emergency declaration :with-
drew its law-making powers. The parliament could be called upon to 
confirm the president's decrees but it could not function as a law-
k . . . . 20 ma ing institution any more. 
Another initial act was the disbanding of all political parties and 
politicq.l associations. A statement in The New York Times describes 
this action very well: 
Mobutu has suspended politics--i.e. the development of regula-
tive procedures, mechanisms and organizational patterns of 
communication, and setting up organs with which political 
struggle occurs. By stressing the elements of stability and 
permanence, he has shelved politics. Mobutu has failed to21 
relate tensional forces of society to the political order. 
18Ibid. 
19unpublished discussion with Donald Morris. See Footnote 9, Ch. 2. 
20 
"Mobutu Assumes Legislative Powers," The New York Times (August 1, 
1967), col. 3, p. 6. 
2111Mobutu Seeking Stronger Federal Control in Congo," The New York 
Times (August 1, 1967), col. 4, p. 8. 
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Government functions were increasingly placed· in. the hand of ''ex-
perts" acting µnder the watchful eye and direc~ supervision of the 
president. This is most easily illustrated by the decline of profes-
sional politicians in the cabinet between 1966 and 1967. In mid-1966, 
almost all ministerial positions were in the hands of .professional 
polit~cians. By the end of 1966, ni~e of the 21 portfolios were in the 
hands of depoliticized university graduates; at the end of 1967, 14 of 
22 those positions were held by the university graduates. 
Parallel .to the increasing importance of the depoliticized experts, 
there was an increasing centralization of power by President Mobutu. By 
the end of 1966, Mobutu held both tq.e functions of chief-of-state and 
head of the government. In .. addition to these functions, he controlled 
the mass media, the Department of Defense, and the natioqal security 
services. And finally, the president reduced the number of provinces 
from 22 to eight and imposed the authority of the·central government 
23 
upon them. 
As was mentioned earlier, Weber noted that one of the.main conse-
quences of bureaucratic development in .a society .. is depersonalization. 
When f~lly developed bureaucracy stands in a specific sense 
under the principle of sine ira ac studio. Its specific 
nat;ure, which is welcomed by capitalism, develops the .more. 
completely it succeeds in eliminating from official business 
love, hatred, and all purely personal, ir~ational and emo-
tional elements. which escape.calculation. This is the spe..,. 
cific nature of bureaucracy and it is appraised as its special 
virtue. 24 
22Willame; "Toward A Caesarist Bureaµcracy," p. 142. 
23Keesings Contemporary Archives (London; January 1967), p. 21807A. 
24Max Weber, "Wirtschaft and Gesellschaft" from Max Weber, Essays 
in Sociology, trans and ed. H. H. Geerth and C. Wright Mills (London, . 
1964), PP• 215-216. 
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Mobutu has not attempted to remove the personal and emotional 
elements as cited above, but he has made a serious attempt to, detribalize 
the society by administrative measures. His government is highly per-
sonalized. Patrimonial relationships are being transformed into per-
sonalization, by an attachment to the president. In October, 1966, 
Mobutu interjected charismatic elements into his politics by "rehabili-
tating Patrice Lumumba. 1125 He claimed to be the spiritual successor of 
Lumumba and projected himself as a.national hero. 26 
The dominant themes of the Mobutu government in mid-1967 became 
highly moralizing and nationalistic; Initially the themes attacked the 
professional politician who was described as being corrupt, treasonous, 
anq exploitive. When this campaign was over, the Lumumba resurrection 
was created. And in mid-1966, a n~w campaign was launched; Economic 
Independence and Congolese control of the economy became the theme. 
However, these campaigns did little to increase the legitimacy of 
the regime or change the political orientations of the masses. Although 
this caesarist bureaucracy showe4 increasing rationality and coherence, 
stability and continuance of political structures remained a goal not a 
reality. 
In mid-1967, i.n an attempt to seek legitimacy of national political 
structur~s and to alter the political attitudes and orientations of the 
masses, Mobutu established the Popular Movement of the. ,Revolution (MPR). 
25Keesings Contemporary Archives (London, October 22, 1966), 
p. 21455A. 
26Ibid. 
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This was done to establish permanent.lines of communication with the 
27 general population. At its creation, the overall goal of the MPR was 
defined "as the mobilization of the masses in order to educate them 
politically, to inform them of government programs and policies, and to 
enlist their active participation in the development of the nation. 1128 
The central document of the MPR is the Manifesto of N'sele, so 
named because it was issued from the president's rural residence at 
N'sele. This doctrine presented the party goals only in general terms 
with the overall doctrine described as one of Congolese nationalism. 
This doctrine stresses the need for broad participation and party mem-
bership in order for the country's problems to be solved. 29 So in the 
party's drive for membership and.its attempt to change the political 
orientations of the masses, the Policy of Authenticity was launched. 
The MPR and Authenticity: Its Origins and 
Implementation and Supporters 
In Zaire, the MPR was founded on May 20, 1967, one-and-a-half years 
after General Mobutu took control of the government. Mobutu believed, 
after the failure or only marginal successes of the previous campaigns, 
that certain state goals could not be achieved without a framework in 
which the nation would be transformed into a.coherent whole, while the 
guiding principles of the party were being disseminated throughout the 
populace. However, in keeping with his distrust of politicians. and 
27Area Handbook for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, p. 246. 
28Ibid. 
29Ibid, pp. 247-248. 
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their political parties he did not call it a party, but a movement, 
because its purpose was to maintain a continuing action. 
But why only a single organization .as opposed to a two-party polit-
30 ical system, as the Constitution of 1967 calls for. Generally, a 
political party is defined as a group of individuals sharing the same 
political and philosophical concepts, and organized for political 
struggle so as to acquire and exercise power. Outside of this rather 
universal definition of a·political party, Zairean, as well as a large 
number of other African states, have taken another approach which de-
fines their special situation. 
In Zaire, the political party has the same characteristics as most 
African single-party political systems. The mutua+ dependence of the 
party and the government is apparent in the.structure and leadership of 
the MPR. The president of the Republic is also head of the party, and, 
the ministers of state serve as members of the party's National Politi-
cal Bureau. In the provinces, the governors serve as the chief party 
officials, and many of the other government administrat;ors also hold, 
party posts. 
In theory, the highest organ of the MPR is the.General Party 
Congress, made up of party officers and, regiona+ representatives. How-
ever, in practice, the supreme body of the,party is the National Poli-
tical Bureau, composed of twenty-one members, including the president, 
who presides over its weekly meetings. An MPR official, Albert Mavungn,. 
described the relationship of the party to the government in the phrase, 
3011constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo," Trans-
lations on Africa (April, 1967), No. 566, Art. 4, of Mobutu~.s calls 
for not more than a two-party system. 
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"The party, by the Political Bureau, decides; the government executes. 1131 
The National Executive Committee works under.the direction of the 
National Political Bureau and coordinates the party activities of the 
provincial, district,. and local cominitte.es. This committee is composed 
of five members: the general secretary, the chairman of the youth wing, 
the secretary for information, and the national treasurer. 
Government administrators fill dual roles in the government and the 
party, and the pattern of MPR authority is pyramidal in form, with each 
unit subordinate to the one directly above it. From the provincial 
level down to the local community level, the party is structured along 
the lines of .the government administration. Provincial committees.func-
tion under the leadership of the governor; and committees corresponding 
to the distr.icts and territories, the provincial subdivisions, are· headed 
by the district commissioners and the territorial administrators. Mayors 
head the town committees, ·and local groups are organized as neighborhood 
cells. 
The party also consists of a youth branch, the JMPR, and also the 
labor movement, the National Union of Congolese Workers (UNTC). Both.of 
which are discussed ·later. 
In Zaire, the party is attempting to develop a new form of struggle, 
namely the struggle, against under-equipment, in order to achieve.· social 
and political development. In order to reach this goal, the party must 
attempt to muster all the forces possible "to cement the union of the. 
various ethnic groups through integration into a single group called a 
nation which elsewhere in.the world preceded the existence of an 
31Area Handbook for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, p. 248. 
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organizecl state. 1132 Thus, the MPR is considered the link that will help 
the country through this periocl of mutation. 
A glance a~ the histor!,of Zaire helps explain the.current poli.U-
cal context. While .it is not the purpose of this.th.esis to• dwell·on the 
h . . 1 f z . 33 i . h t th t f f" istorica events o aire, t is enoug . o say . a a ter ive years 
of secessions, mutinies, ·and, open. warfare, in which .over 100 poli·tical 
parties helped fan the ideas of regionalism and .. tribB:lism, even a two-
party system was considered dangerous by the new power elite. 34 
In addition to the historical events in Zaire, a more theoretical 
explanation may be advanced. In a divided society, the party represents 
and defends the interests of a class; the existe,nce . of several parties 
is a reflection of a.struggle.conducted by the various classes in the 
society. In an attei:npt to alter these orientations and attitudes and to 
mold one.coordin~ted group .out· of many, the existence of more.than one 
party to achieve this purpose woulcl be cliametrically opposed to the 
purpose. 
Thus, in Mobutu's attempt to alter the.orientations and attitudes 
of the masses, he has. focused all sources of legitimacy on, the party. 
The·party has become synonymous with the state. 
This trilogy: People, Movement, and Stat~, makes the MPR the. 
primary reference for any action by the State. On the.othei; 
hand, this relative mingling of three elements o.f a .single 
whole requires the predominance of the Movement over all other 
institutions. The Republic only acts through the will of the 
32 Young, Politics in the ·.Congo, p. 5. 
33rw0 excellent sources that present an in depth analysis of the 
initial five years of Congolese independence are: M. Crawford.Young, 
Politics in.the Congo; and Coner C. O'Brien, To Katanga and Back (New 
York, 1964). 
34Young, "Congo Political Parties Revisited," p. 16. 
Movement. Thus the MPR is the Supreme Institution of the 
Republic of Zaire; all other ins~itu~ions are subordinated 
to it and operate under its control. 5 
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Once the party was organized and established, a doctrine was needed 
in the leadership attempts to politically educate the general populace. 
This doctrine as spelled out by the MPR Manifesto has become known as 
"Authentic Zairean Nationalism.'' The Manifesto states the purpose· of 
this program of authenticity. 
In order for all Zaireans to become authentic nationalists, we 
must free ourselves of the complexes which characterize a 
colonized. people and free ourselves of all impulses which 
negate our values.36 
Thus, authenticity is the politic~l metqod by which the.Zairean 
leadership is attempting to create a.Zairean first and African second. 
As Mobutu stated, he must convince the Zairean that he is.not "a French-
man, a Belgian, an .American or an Italian from Africa, but that he is an 
African from Zaire. 1137 
Authentic Zairean Nationalism was a movement which aimed at estab-
lishing a society based on.national values. It was an attempt to create 
a new political culture by integrating all the societi,es and their 
political cultures into a unified one an4 to create a nation which is 
aware of its own values. 
In this area, the.MFR started by changing the currency. It 
followed this by changing the European names of all towns and cities, 
streets, public squares and monuments. Finally, the river, country, 
35Keesings Contemporary Archives (London, December 1970), 
p. 23614A. 
3611N'Sele Manifesto," Translations on Africa (June, 1967), No. 798. 
37unpublished Lecture by Mobutu at the University of Zaire in 
November, 1967, as related by Donald Morris. See Footnote 9, Ch. 2. 
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and all citizens were all given authentic Zairean names. 
More importantly, the equcation system was changed.· For example, 
in the colonial era all students were taught the history.and geography 
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of the Gauls, Belgium, and France, and virtually nothing about their own 
state. Now the system teaches about the early history of Zaire and how 
the early society was organized and that life revolved around the com-
munity. Thus, the new education program stresses the Zairean ancestory 
and how the authenticity program is an attempt to reorganize the society 
around the national community. 39 Finally, authenticity is a philosophi-
cal position which stresses a psychological change: , 
It is the affirmation of a choice, of an idealogy which does 
not accept universal doctrines. Choices must be dictated by 
the realities of the environment. Authenticity will show the 
people how to live their own lives, and how to take responsi-
bility for their own future.40 
Thus, Mobutu, through the MPR and its doctrine of authenticity, has 
attempted to weld together a number of various ethnic groups into a 
unified nation. But is this just rhetoric aimed at insuring his own 
position or have any changes occurred that support this political 
method? A brief look at the new regime support groups helps provide an 
answer. 
Of course, the army is the major supportive group, however, since 
they achieved some degree of unity before the MPR and its policies were 
launched, other groups should be looked at to gain a better measure of 
verification. 
38rnternational Fides Services.(Rome, September 1973), No. 3824. 
39rbid., and Area Handbook for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
pp. 159-160. 
40The New York Times (February 14, 1972), col. 4, p. 14. 
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University students serve as a good indicator of regime support. 
In Africa, South America and Southeast Asia, the support of this group 
often means the difference between regime maintenance or.loss of power. 
In the Congo, students first participated in politics at the time 
of Mobutu's first coup in September, 1960. In an attempt to end the 
chaos of the time, Mobutu gave the students a major hand in the control 
of the government. He created the College of Commissioners, staffed it 
with university students or recent graduates, and gave-it the task of 
governing the Congo. 
This unique political experiment failed because the.· students lacked 
the political and administrative training. Also, their funct.ions were 
never clearly defined, thu~, creating a lot of overlap in many of the 
ministerial portfolios. Upon ,the collapse of the College of Commission-
ers, the students took up the role of opposition ,to the return of the old 
political elite. "On the whole, however, the students lacked identity, 
unity, and sense of purpose. 1141 
With Mobutu's return to power in 1965, the position of the student 
has greatly improved. Once Mobutu consolidated his position and intro-
duced the MPR, the regime responded positively to the student demands 
"by re~integrating the students into national and regional administra-
tions. It is this body that makes up a majority of the MPR cadre and is 
disseminating the principles of the MPR. 1142 Thus, Mobutu has accom-
plished what none· of the other power elite of Zaire could do, and 
41willame, "Toward A Caesarist Bureaucracy," p. 151. 
42International Fides Services (Rome, January.1973), No. 2464. 
"that is to combine the symbpls of Lumumbism with concrete reform 
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measures to harness the loyalty and energy of the students." 
There are still, areas in which the ,students.are d,iscontentedwith 
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the goverrµnent. For example, they are concerned about the poor quality 
of instructors .and the limited. facilities at the university. On the 
whole, however, the students accept the stability that the Mobutu regime 
has given the country and the principles of the MPR. 
Another regime supportive group was.the urban youth.· When Mobutu 
took.power, he received a great amqunt of support from the various youth 
moveme.nts which he· organized into the .Volunteer Corps of the Republic 
(CVR). In 1967, Mobutu reorgaq.ized, thfa group into the Junior Popular 
Revolu1;:{.onary Movement (JMPR) to re-educate the.youth of the country to 
the principles of authenticity. Although the stateq purpose of the 
organization ;was "to promote national consciousness among tQ.e masses and 
. . . i h ' . 1144 i h b i i h part1c1pat1on n t e country s reconst;ruction, n t e . eg Qn ng t e. 
organization functioned as an intelligence agency spend,ing most of its 
time watching the old politicians. Since late 1970, however, the youth 
movement·has served as one.of the main veh~oles for dissemin~tion,of the 
MPR's policies to the.masses. It has been,overhauled, and it nqw has a 
chapter in almost every city and village, and many of the members serve 
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as MPR cadre at the grassroots level. 
Labor is another major support .group of the Mobutu regime and its 
policies. In January, 1968, all labor unions were consolidated, in.the 
43willame, "Toward A Caesarist Bureaucracy," p. 151. 
44ibi4., p. 149. 
45Area Handbook.for the Democratic.Republic of the Congo, pp. 249-
250. 
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National Union of Congolese Workers (UNTC). The governing body.of this 
organization was given the responsibility of rewriting the Labor Code to 
protect the rights and benefits of the workers. It also created a 
National Labor Council that arbitrates strikes and institutes better 
health and safety conditions.. The major factor support from labor was 
Mobutu's willingness to raise the minimum wage by about 45 percent in 
1971. The UNTC has become the major connnunicator for the MPR in the 
labor environment. It has been through this structure that government 
policies have been passed down, and at the same time it has acted as a. 
spring-board for demands made by the workers on the government. With 
better pay, working conditions., and benefits, the Labor force has become 
a major supportive group of the MPR and its policies. 
What about the general populace? Has the MPR made inroads in alter-
ing political attitudes? The answer is qifficult to make because of the 
lack of political material concerning the outlying areas. However, 
certain indicators are available. Although the MPR and the .authenticity 
program have enjoyed consiqerably more success in the cities than in the 
countryside, most contemporary Zairean "experts" agree that the programs 
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are slowly being accepted in the rural areas. The main reasons have 
been Mobutu's ability to stabilize the countryside, the party's attempts 
47 to curb corruption in the government at all levels, and the public · 
works projects that Mobutu and the MPR have initiated. Projects such as 
46scholars such as Jean-Claude Willame, Crawfor4 Young, Rene Lemar-
chand and author Dona14 Morris, from their various writings in the po-
litical journals all agree that Mobutu's program is gaining acceptance 
in the countryside. 
47In 1965, almost 50 percent of total government revenue disappeared 
in corruption. In 1973, thi$ figure had dropped to less than 25 percent. 
J)epartment of State, Update: Republic of Zaire, p. 11. 
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opening roads from provincial capitals to outlying areas have made 
possible higher earnings for the farmers and have opened a connnunication 
system between the party and the farmers. The construction of hospitals, 
schools, and other public services.in the rural area have all aided in 
changing the political values of the rural population. 48 
This chapter .has concerned itseif with the rise of a.new political 
elite, the differences between it and the elite that was displaced, the 
growth of a new political party, the ideology of that party, and finally 
the effects of that ideology on the &eneral population of Zaire. This 
chapter has attempted to explain the creation of a dominant.political 
culture and has described the initial results of the changes. Only time 
will reveal the vitality of the effort. 
48The New York Times (October 22, 1969), col. 4, p • .Z; (June 28, 
1970), col. 1, p. ·1s; and (December 1, 1973), col. 1, p. 3. 
CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis is based on the hypothesis that a dominant political 
culture will more likely be generated by an integrated political leader-
ship working through a,single party system than a pluralistic leadership 
dispersed within a multiparty system, in an ethnically fragmented society 
such as Zaire. The importance of such a hypothesis is the contribution 
toward an understanding of the colonial society, the dialectic of de-
colonization, the elements in the political system as they have operated 
in the environment of independence, and the importance of an established 
dominant political cultur~ for the society i.e., an awareness of and 
support for the national political system as a whole, a basic conception 
of how politics will be conducted, and a civility in politics that will 
smooth the edges of political disagreement rather than looking at each 
individual political question as a life or death struggle. 
Granting that the predominance of parochial loyalties constituted a 
formidable obstacle to the creation of a dominant political culture in 
Zaire, how should one account for the failure of the initial political 
leadership to transcend regional and ethnic particularisms? Was it a 
reflection of Belgian colonialism? How has the new generation of politi-
cal leadership transcended regional and ethnic particularisms? Was it a 
reflection of Belgian colonialism? How has the new generation of poli-
tical leaders attempted to deal with this problem and to what extent have 
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these leaders been .able to alter the politic.al attitudes and values. of 
the populace in their attempts to create a dominant political culture? 
From the outset of the Congo's independence, there were three major 
problems confronting the leadership in their quest to create a dominant 
political culture. One was the fact that Congolese nationalism received 
its initial drive from a narrow-based political movement which asserted 
itself as the vehicle of an ethnic type of nationalism. As was mentioned 
earlier, the avant-garde of this type nationalism was founded by the 
Bakongo who worked through the political party ABAK.O. This spearheading 
role enabled its members to pose as the champions of independence. Since 
the ABAKO could claim credit for initiating the first important steps 
toward independence, it attempted to endow its leaders with the aura of 
legitimacy for taking over the reins of governmental leadership after 
independence. Since this organization was one based on Bakongo values 
and attitudes, the other ethnic groups could not join it; thus, they 
formed new movements which in turn became regional or ethnic in nature. 
This particular aspect of Congolese nationalism has been paralleled 
in other African states. For example, the dominant role.played by the 
Baganda in Uganda, the Ewe in Togo, and the Ibo in Nigeria. However, in 
these other cases, the separatist implications of these narrow-based 
movements were overcome by unified territorial movements. This was es-
pecially the case in Nigeria. To quote Professor Coleman: "The vision 
of the prestige and power that a.unified Nigeria would bring was highly 
seductive, and therefore sobering. As a resu:)_t, self-government was 
1 postponed for a few years." · In contra~t, hqwever, the Bakongo and 
1 James S. Coleman, Nigeria: Backgroun<l to Nationalism, (Berkeley 
and Los Angeles, 1961), p. 42. 
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other Congolese ethnic groups refused to delay independence for the sake 
of the national politic;al system as a whole. Th~y lacked the patience 
to do so, and refused to accommodate their ultimate political objective 
of creating their own individual.states within the larger Congo terri-
tory. This refusal to accept the idea of a unified Congo as the primary 
objective led to the failure of the leadership to resolve the basic 
issue of the type .. of political system that was, to be established-~ 
federalist or unitary. 
The· second major problem facing the initial leadership was the lack 
of mutual confidence and respect. This was mainly the result of Belgian 
colonial policies which refused the Congolese leaders the opportunity to 
conduct among themselves common political actions. The initial elites 
grew up in a number of regional centers with virtually no contact among 
themselves on a national scale until the Brussels Exposition in 1958. 
Before this event the ·leadership had no opportunity for travel .. either 
within the boundaries of the Congo, or travel overseas and were thus 
sealed off with considerable effectiveness until the eve of independence. 
By that time the seeds of ethnic and regional rivalriei:i were too deeply 
ingrained to allow for a degree of civility in political interaction. 
Thus, the tensions created by political disagreements became viewed as 
struggles for supremacy among competing groups. 
The. third major problem was the very different conc.eptions of the 
content of independence between. the leadership and the mass. The leader-
ship prop·osed to take over the management of an effective administrative 
system and operate it more effectively. From the oratory of the election 
campaigns the mass understood that the benefits of independence meant 
in<~reased opportunities for schools, medical treatment, jobs, and 
49 
farming equipment, lower taxes and· the elimination of forced labor on 
road networks. As soonias the Congo achieved independence, the.facade·of 
a united grassroot .support for ind.ependence underwent a radical change.· 
The promises. of increased opportunities were not kept, and in most areas 
taxation actually increased rather than decreased. Also, the .new depu-
ties and provincial councilors failed, to communicate ·with .their co.nsti-
tuents. The latter,. who had placed high hopes in these officials, were 
bitterly disappointed by what they considered to be total indifference 
to their desiderata. Thus, in 1962, the president of the MNC in Walikale 
district of Orientale province wrote, that .the local, representatives 
"never visited . the people of Walika .. le to inquire about their needs and 
grievances .and that the whole popula.tioD: of Walika,le laµient,s that it has 
never.had a chance to meet.its provincial councilors."2 Thus, many of 
the Congolese felt that only the politicians would reap the benefits of 
independence. 
Anothei:: source of tenE!ion .between the leadership and the people.was 
the breakdown of the ,political parties themselves. In the countryside,. 
party activity ceased from 1960 to. 1970. For example, party membership 
cards were no longer sold, meetings were no longer held, and eventually 
branches quietly ceased to function. The wholesale and aQrupt Africani-
zation .of the civil ser:yice brought.about by the mass exodu~ of Belgian 
civil servan~s after the revolt .of the For.ce Publique, absorbeq the ma..;. 
jority of the party leader:s. Thus, in the competition .for power, the 
3 
mass .base was no longer releyant •. 
2temarchand, Political Awakening in.the Congo, p. 290. 
3 Young, "Congo Political Pa~ties Revisited," pp. 20-21. 
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Also, the Africanbation of the civil service created the final 
break between the mass. and the leadership. Besides the fact that the 
nu~ber of posts to be filled could ~rdly expect to meet the .demand, 
nepotism became predominant in the upper reaches of the civil service. 
Many secretaries, deputy secretaries, and uq.dersecretaries were appointed 
on the basis of merit, but th.is was the exception rather than typical. 
In most•instances, a minister not .only selected his chef de cabinet 
among his friends and relatives from his own.ethn:i,c group, but his ad-
ministrative staff as well. Party members denied the~e favors, became · 
embittered by the situation. The mass initially reacted by withd,rawing 
into cynicism and· ali,enation., "Politician", came to mean, he who usurped 
all the material benefits of independence. Thus, when General Mobutu 
took control of the government. in November 1965, and took.away.the power 
of the politician hardly a voice was raised in the. countryside. 4 
An even,more.difficult task of this study was to explain the role of 
Belgian .colonial ,policies and their.effects on the failure of the.ini~ 
tial leadership in creating a dominant·political CU:lture. No effort at 
all was made to institutionalize social changes through meaningful re-
presentative organs. This was evidenced by a.tota~ absence of integra-
tive governmental istructure at the local and central levels to aE!sist 
the.Congolese communities toward the attainment of common goals. Thus, 
when the Africans. took control of the government ~hey were faced with 
the almost impossible task of developing governmental machinery.where 
none had previously existed. · 
4willame, "Toward A Caesarist Bureaucracy," pp. · 130-143. 
51 
There were other re~sons for Belgium's failure to assist ,in devel-
oping a dominant political c~lture among the Congolese •. First, compared 
to the colonial prese~ce of England and France, BelgiaI). colonial rule 
was exceedingly short~-57 years. However, even if Belgium cq4lq have. 
maintained its presence for more than.its fifty-seven·years, there is nq 
guarantee that it could have produced a more·effective union.of the 
various Congolese ethnic groups. Aside ,from the difficulties arising 
from the nature of the Belgian colonial polic:i,es there was the fact·that 
Belgium itself ha.s a qiyid~d political culture in which national,. symbols 
were.generally identified with a.subculture, i.e., either Flemish or 
Walloon, rather thaJ:l with a larger,national.political culture •. Obviously 
then, a nation that lacks a stroI).g nationa,l group awareness, such as 
Belgilllll, can not be expect.ad to ignite strong. nationa],. loyalties among 
other diverse peoples. Thus, as Professor Willame observeq, "fJ;om tqis 
contact between two countries, none of which was a nation, resulted a 
total absence of national political structuring. 115 
Another element that inhibited the creatioI). of a.dominant political 
culture had to d,o with the several media in which the Belgian ,accultura-
tive int.eres.ts were placed on the Congolese scene, i.e., int,erests of; 
businessmen, colonial administrators, and the various Christian mission-
aries. These agencies, which were involved in the .colonial contr01 of; 
the Congolese, produced wid,espread ambivalenc,e in the attituqe of the, 
Congolese toward the locus and nature of civil authority.. In other 
words, independence meant the eviction of Belgian-vested interests 
5congo 1960-1962, (Bruxelles, 1963), p. 159. 
rather than a co11DD.on strivin,g toward the construction of a viable , 
. 6 
nation-state. 
The e.ssential el~ent of society is the interaction of human 
beings in such a manner as tp mutually benef,it and support one 
another. But if man is to love,in spcie:ty, he must have some 
way of steering it so that the society can collectively make 
decisions about.its public posture and policies. This process 
must take place.in the poliUcal culture of a society.7 
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+he essential element mentioned above ,has no:t be~n present in Zaire and 
it is this elemen.t that Mol:iutu through the MPR ha!=! been .attempting; to. 
produce in the Zairean society. But ha~ Mobutu been any more successful 
than the previous leadership in bringing about a harmonious "interaction 
o:e human beings?" The answer of course can not be definite; however, 
the MPR at the time of thi1;1 writing has begun,to move·the Zaireans on 
this course. 
Since November, 1965, ~resident Mobutu has been the dominant force 
in the.political scene. In addi:tion to his control over the,gove+nmen:t 
and the security fprces as head of state aqd head of government, he is 
also the founder and leader of the MPR. Since his assumption of power, 
Mobutu has progressively centralized political power in the office and 
person of the president. The Constitution of June 1967 provided for a 
strong presidential system with the office of prime minister being in-
corporated into that of the president. The chief of state·was further 
empowered to n~e and recall members.a~ government; government ministers, 
8 
and provincial ministers were made direc~ly responsible to.the president. 
6wyatt MacGaffey, "Kongo and·the King of the American1;1 1 " Journ,~l 
of Modern African.Studies, VI, No. 2 (August, .1968), pp. 179-181. 
7Almond and Coleman, p. 247. 
811constitution of the .Democratic Republic of. the Congo,'' Articles 
1, 2, 3, 15, 16, 33, anq ·54. 
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In other words, Mobutu has been attempting to establish legitimacy in the 
office of the presidency. The initial leadership failed in its efforts 
to do this because the basic principle of the .multi-party system was the 
promotion of interests of only a specific region .or ethnic group. Thus, 
there was not an awareness of or support for the national political 
system as a whole. 
Since its creation in May 1967, the MPR has developed as the locus 
of political power and the only channel to political office. Under the 
guidance of the president, party leaders have carried out intensive pro-
grams of political education. On both the national and, local levels, 
the MPR has sought to orient attit:udes toward civic ,responsibility and 
active participation in political affairs. Although the MPR has more. 
influence in urban areas, the government has increasingly made efforts 
toward the extension of political activities in all parts of the 
9 
country. 
The populace now tends to view the government and the political 
party as one and the same, primarily because of the duality of role.s 
whereby government officials are also party leaders. Both government 
10 
and party are looked upon as voices of authority to be obeyed. Enthu-
siasm for political party activities is more evident among the under-
thirt:y age group, particularly among primary and secondary school 
students who are objects of political indoctrination, and among persons 
h · b di 1 d · d" 1 d h 11 w ose Jo s are · rec t y an in. i.rec t .y connec te to t .e government. 
9The New York Times (January 31, 197 2), col. 1, p. 58. 
10 Armed Forces Press Clips, Vol. IX, No. 49 (Dec. 3, 1974), p. 23. 
11Ibid. ' p. 24. 
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As mentioned before, in the more, remote areas of the c~untry, the 
influence of the government and party was weaker than in urban ~reas. 
Life goes on much the same as it has in th.e past dec;ades, and the bene ... 
fits of political, social, and economic progress are·only very slowly 
being extended to the outlying areas. However, since mid-1972, the 
goyernment and the MPR have been making a concerted effort to .increase 
their influence in these areas. The methods by which,this is being done 
is the construc~ion .of new roads and the development of communication' 
media, the construction .of numerous school~ and medical facilities, and 
the appointment of MPR representatives who establish cellul,ar branches 
12 
of the party in the remote villages of the areas. The effects of 
these programs at this time can not be.evaluated because they are too 
new, but it can be noted that because of the increase of the connnunica-
. tion .networks, the sale of cash crops in the district markets has in-
13 
creased 13.8 percent over any other recorded year. Also, United 
Nations health pfficials have recorded somewhat smaller infant·mortality 
rates over.the past two years than previously existed in Orientale 
'. 14' proVl.nce. 
Thus, Mobutu and the MPR have begun to accomplish the goals that 
were articulated when the MPR was or~ginally established. First, the 
MPR has established the ·infrastructure that has been able to draw atten-
tion to the central authority. Thus, it .has been abie to project.an 
image that has im.pre$nated the ideas of "nation-state'~. Secondly, the . 
12The New York 'Ximes (January 31, 1972), col. 1, p. 58.: Agency for 
International Devel.omnent~ Annual Report; Zaire (July 19,74), pp. 119-126. 
13Ibid., p. 121. 
14Ibid., p. 122. 
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MFR has established the guidelines of how political activity will be 
conducted, i.e., there is no longer any question as to what type of 
governmental formula will be established; unitarism has overcome the 
forces of federalism. And finally, the MFR has introduced civility into 
the political life of Zaire; since early 1968, there has not been a 
single challenge to the authority of President Mobutu or the MFR. Hence, 
Mobutu, through the MFR and the.program of authenticity, has interjected 
into the political life of Zaire a political culture that stresses unity 
among the people and a definite character in the political system. 
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